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1 
Employers adopt employee evaluation systems—including performance measures 
and implicit and explicit incentives—to change employee effort, ideally to bring 
that effort in line with the employer’s objectives. Evaluation can, however, change 
employee effort and decisions in unintended ways. This potential distortion of 
effort is of particular concern in multitask jobs if the evaluation measure captures 
only a subset of (differentially weights) the job tasks (Holmstrom and Milgrom 
1991, Baker 1992). In this paper we provide an empirical example of this multitask 
distortion in schools. In their seminal paper, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) use 
the example of a teacher tasked both with teaching basic (testable) skills and with 
teaching higher-order thinking (non-testable) skills, but where only the basic skills 
contribute to her evaluation because they can be measured in student tests. In 
contrast, we study an example where a teacher’s different students are the different 
tasks over which she must allocate effort. 
The design of evaluation is a salient and timely topic in the education sector. 
In particular, the use of student test scores in school and individual teacher 
performance evaluation has become a central feature of education policy and 
management in recent decades.1 The stated motivations for evaluation are, first, to 
inform personnel decisions about individual teachers, for example, retention, 
tenure, and hiring decisions. And, second, to induce increases in teacher (school) 
effort, but only occasionally by attaching explicit financial incentives.2 Higher 
average performance of the teacher workforce, either through increased effort from 
1
 The recent use of tests began first with state-level policies in the 1980s and 90s, then the federal 
No Child Left Behind (NCLB) regulations in the early 2000s, and more recently individual teacher 
evaluation prompted by the federal Race to the Top and NCLB waivers.  
In US schools, at least in recent decades, the term “accountability” is often used to mean the same 
thing as performance evaluation with explicit (implicit) incentives. In this paper we use the terms 
performance evaluation and performance measure, but, as we describe in detail later, the evaluation 
systems in this setting include NCLB regulations and similar state programs. 
2
 Incentives to increase effort need not be monetary, of course. Reback, Rockoff, and Schwartz 
(2014) report evidence that untenured teachers work longer hours when under pressure from test-
based performance evaluation; teachers also feel less job security. 
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or better selection of teachers, would benefit students. A large literature now 
documents meaningful variation between teachers in their contributions to student 
learning (see Jackson, Rockoff, and Staiger 2014 for a recent review). Moreover, 
teachers who make larger contributions to learning, as measured by standardized 
tests in elementary and middle school, are also teachers who make larger 
contributions to their students’ outcomes in adulthood, like labor market earnings 
and college attendance (Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff 2014). 
In the case we study, a short-lived feature of state evaluation rules created 
sharp differences across students (tasks) in the evaluation-score returns to teacher 
effort directed at different students. Briefly, in all years, teachers and schools were 
evaluated based on end-of-school-year student test scores. During the short-lived 
“retest policy” years, students who failed the test were retested 2-3 weeks later, and 
then only the higher of the two scores was used to calculate teacher and school 
performance evaluation measures. This retest policy created a strong incentive to 
allocate more effort to students who failed, (potentially) at the cost of less effort for 
students who passed. Critically, the incentives changed discontinuously at the 
pass/fail cutoff score, so that students near that cutoff who had arguably identical 
educational need for (returns to) teacher effort were weighted differently in the 
teacher evaluation because test measurement error had assigned their binary “pass” 
or “fail” status. 
We find evidence consistent with teachers distorting their effort toward the 
retest students, as we would expect given the evaluation incentives. Using 
regression discontinuity methods, we show that students who barely fail the end of 
school-year 𝑡𝑡 math test, and are then retested, score higher one year later (the 𝑡𝑡 + 1 
test) than their classmates who barely pass at 𝑡𝑡. Note the outcome here is not the 
3 
retest score itself.3 The difference in scores at 𝑡𝑡 + 1 is approximately 0.03 student 
standard deviations (σ). The difference is small, but not inconsistent with a 2-3 
week treatment, assuming the effects operate primarily (only) through changes 
during the period between the initial and retest.  
This difference between passing and failing students occurs during the retest 
policy years, but not in the years before or after. Figure 1 shows year-by-year RD 
estimates for 𝑡𝑡 = 2003 through 2015; the retest policy years are 2009 through 2012. 
The pattern of results in Figure 1 strengthens the case for interpreting the 0.03σ 
difference as occurring because of the retesting rules. A key category of threat to 
that interpretation is that other relevant educational inputs may be discontinuously 
assigned at the pass/fail cutoff. One such potential threat is the probability of 
repeating a grade, which we address in detail in the paper.  
We combine the pass/fail cutoff (RD) variation and the over-time retest 
policy variation in a difference-in-RD identification strategy. Causal interpretation 
of our diff-in-RD estimates requires a weaker assumption than the simple RD. If 
we only had data from the four retest policy years, and thus a conventional RD 
estimate, we would need the conventional RD assumption: that potential outcomes 
(math scores) are continuous at the pass/fail cutoff both with the retest policy and 
without the policy. Using the diff-in-RD design we can relax the assumption by 
adding: however, if there are discontinuities in potential outcomes unrelated to the 
retest policy, those discontinuities are constant across the retest years and non-retest 
years. In the body of the paper we show evidence, and discuss institutional details, 
consistent with these assumptions. 
One key result emphasizes the distinction between effects of retesting per 
se and effect of the retest policy. There was some retesting prior to the start of the 
3
 The end of 𝑡𝑡 + 1 test is the first time we observe math outcomes for both passing and failing 
students. These main results do not use the retest score, though we do make use of the retest scores 
when discussing mechanisms. 
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retesting policy in select grades and districts. Importantly, however, the pre-2009 
retest scores were not used in calculating teacher evaluation scores; the pre-2009 
retesting had no (little) effect on teachers’ evaluation incentives. If retesting per se 
caused improvements in students’ future math scores, we should see those effects 
in the select grades and districts even before the retesting policy. In fact, we do not 
see such effects. Our estimates are quite similar for grades and districts with and 
without pre-2009 retesting. Effects only appear when the stakes change for the 
adults in the school. 
 One mechanism for our main result is that (a) students were taught more 
math during the 2-3 weeks before the retest, and that extra learning persisted one 
year later. However, the 0.03σ difference at 𝑡𝑡 + 1 could arise from other types of 
mechanisms: (b) teachers and schools treated retest students differently during the 
subsequent school year after the retest, or (c) students themselves behaved 
differently. We do not find evidence consistent with (b) or (c). For example, 
relevant to mechanism type (c), treatment did not affect student absences during the 
subsequent year, nor did failing the math test affect reading scores at 𝑡𝑡 + 1; both 
suggesting students did not differentially change their effort. Also, relevant to 
mechanism type (b), we do not find differences in repeating grade or differences in 
the quality of teachers or peers to which students are assigned. Moreover, among 
students who barely failed the initial test nearly two-thirds passed the retest which 
would have removed, or at least blunted, the signal of “failed the test last year.” 
We do find evidence consistent with mechanism type (a): students were 
taught more math in the 2-3 weeks before the retest. For example, schools’ test date 
decisions suggest they were trying to exploit this mechanism. In brief, schools have 
some discretion over test dates within a state-defined window. Before the retest 
policy schools facing pressure to improve test scores scheduled their tests relatively 
late in the window; after the retest policy began those schools moved their initial 
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test date up earlier. This switch is consistent with schools valuing time between the 
initial test and retest more than they value time before the initial test.  
Our paper makes a novel contribution to the existing literature on 
unintended or unwanted responses to evaluation in schools. That literature already 
includes examples of manipulation of the performance measure: simple cheating 
per se (Jacob and Levitt 2003), but also manipulating which students are tested 
(Cullen and Reback 2006). Examples of the latter include differential suspension 
from school during the test period (Figlio 2006), special education designation 
(Jacob 2005, Figlio and Getzler 2006), grade retention in untested grades (Jacob 
2005). Manipulation can also occur through test-taking skills and tricks which are 
orthogonal to the learning tests are intended to measure (Jacob 2005, Koretz 2017). 
The existing literature also includes examples of unintended distortion of 
teacher and school effort. For example, teachers shifting effort away from untested 
subjects, like science and social studies, and toward tested subjects, like math and 
reading (Jacob 2005, Dee and Jacob 2011). The results in Macartney (2016) suggest 
schools distort effort across time within students; in short, schools with different 
grade spans (e.g., K-5, K-6, K-8) face different incentives in an evaluation based 
on student score growth over time.4  
Our paper is most closely related to Neal and Schanzenbach (2010, “NS”) 
which also focuses on teachers’ effort allocation across students, and how 
evaluation based on student test scores changes that allocation. Studying the 
Chicago Public Schools, NS measures how NCLB affected student scores, and, 
importantly, how those effects differed (or not) across the distribution of students’ 
pre-NCLB scores. The NCLB performance measure is the percent of students who 
pass the test, thus incentivizing teachers and schools to make effort allocation 
4
 Adnot (2016) shows evidence that teachers distort effort across instructional tasks when evaluated 
by classroom observations; teachers respond to the incentives implied by the relative ease or 
difficulty of scoring well on a given task in the observation scoring system. 
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across students a function of the student’s probability of passing. In slang terms, 
focus on the “bubble kids.” Consistent with the incentives, NS finds NCLB-induced 
gains for students in the middle of the achievement distribution, but not for the low 
(high) achieving students with little chance of passing (failing). NS also finds this 
pattern of results for a district policy similar to NCLB but introduced in 1996, and 
evidence from other settings is consistent with the NS results (Burgess et al. 2005, 
Reback 2008, Springer 2008). 
Our paper differs from Neal and Schanzenbach (2010, “NS”), and related 
work, in two ways both arising from the sharp discontinuity in incentives in the 
retest policy. First, the shift in teacher (school) effort across students implied by the 
NS results was partially intended by NCLB and similar policies, specifically the 
shift in effort from students higher in the distribution to students further down. Less 
effort for the lowest achieving students was presumably an unintended 
consequence. In the retesting policy case, students just above and below the 
pass/fail cutoff have arguably identical educational claim on (returns to) teacher 
effort; a difference in teacher effort across that pass/fail margin is clearly 
unintended. Second, the NS results clearly document different effects of NCLB 
across the distribution of achievement; students in the middle of the distribution 
benefited more. However, it may be that teachers and schools increased effort for 
the lowest achieving students as well, but those students’ scores were not 
responsive to the increase in effort; this seems more plausible the further down the 
distribution one moves. By contrast, in the current paper, students just above and 
below the pass/fail cutoff should be equally responsive to any change in teacher 
effort, and indeed the students should be equal at expectation in other unobservable 
ways.  
In summary, in this paper we show evidence that teacher effort can be 
unintentionally distorted by performance evaluation systems. Given two students 
with identical educational needs, teachers can be induced to give more effort to one 
7 
of the two through evaluation incentives. This result is contrary to the idea, claimed 
by some, that teachers are perfectly motivated agents whose effort is determined by 
professional judgement and whose effort is invariant to evaluation incentives. This 
result also emphasizes, alongside the other literature cited above, the importance of 
careful design of evaluation systems. 
In the next section we describe the evaluation program and incentives 
teachers (schools) faced across the time period we study, and, critically, the changes 
that the retest policy made. Section 2 describes the econometric details. In section 
3 we present our main results, and in section 4 we examine robustness and potential 
mechanisms. Then we conclude with some discussion. 
1. Setting and data
We study students, teachers, and schools in North Carolina over a 14-year 
period from the 2002-03 through 2015-16. Throughout this period, North 
Carolina’s schools and teachers were subject to state and federal systems of 
evaluation (accountability) based on student test scores. The retest policy was in 
place for four years: 2008-09 through 2011-12. In this section we describe the 
evaluation systems, retest policy, and other related details. 
The specifics of the retest policy are the explicit mechanical features of the 
“treatment” we are studying. However, as is clear by the paper’s introduction, we 
do not see these explicit mechanical specifics as the only mechanisms behind the 
results. We return to a discussion of the mechanisms in Section 4. 
All data used in this paper were provided by the North Carolina Education 
Research Data Center at Duke University. The data are typical of school 
administrative data, including annual records for each student with school attended, 
test scores, demographic characteristics, and program participation variables. We 
also construct data linking students to teachers and classes. Throughout the paper 
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we refer to school years by their spring date—the 2002-03 school year is 𝑡𝑡 = 2003 
and so on. 
1.1 School and teacher evaluation in North Carolina, 2003-2016 
Throughout the period we study, 2003-2016, North Carolina teachers and 
schools were evaluated based on both student test score levels and test score 
growth. Our description of the details focuses on elementary and middle schools. 
Students in grades 3-8 were tested annually each spring in math and reading.5 These 
test scores are the basis for the performance measures and incentives described in 
the next few paragraphs. 
North Carolina’s state evaluation system, known as the ABCs of Public 
Instruction (ABCs), began in 1996-97 several years before our study period. The 
ABCs performance measure was a school-level measure; it was a weighted average 
of a test-score growth measure and a test-score levels measure.6 The levels measure 
was the percent of students who passed the end of year exam, much like the NCLB 
measure. Test scale scores were divided into four mutually-exclusive and 
exhaustive ordered categories, known as “Level I” through “Level IV,” for each 
grade and subject. A student passed if they scored Level III or higher. This passing 
threshold is the same cutoff for the retesting policy we discuss later.  
The ABCs growth measure was the school mean of the difference between 
a student’s actual score and a state-specified expected score. The growth score was 
quite close in practice to the school mean of predicted student residuals, after a 
regression of standardized (mean 0, s.d. 1) year 𝑡𝑡 score on standardized year 𝑡𝑡 − 1 
5
 Tests in other subjects are more sporadic. In more recent years, for example, grade 5 and 8 students 
were tested in science. Earlier in our study period, grade 4 and 7 students were tested in writing. 
6
 Our description of ABCs, READY, and other state programs in this section is drawn from historical 
documents found on the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction’s website 
(www.ncpublicschools.org). The authors are happy to share those documents. In this paper we use 
the terms “growth” and “level.” In North Carolina, the growth component was also sometimes called 
“gain” and the level component was known as “performance.” 
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score for a given subject and grade. However, the standardization was based on a 
preset mean and standard deviation, and the coefficient on 𝑡𝑡 − 1 score was 
estimated in a regression using prior years’ data. In short, the growth measure was 
responsive to any increase (decrease) in individual student test scores, not just 
changes in passing status. 
Beginning in 2002-03 North Carolina’s schools, along with all other schools 
receiving federal Title I funds, were also subject to the student test score based 
evaluation regulations known as No Child Left Behind (NCLB). Note that our data 
also begin in 2003. The NCLB performance measure was also a school-level 
measure, but it used only student test-score levels.7 Just like ABCs, the levels 
measure was the percent of students who passed (scored Level III or higher) the 
end of year exam. The measure was often referred to as “percent proficient.”  
Varied consequences and incentives were attached to the ABCs and NCLB 
performance measures. As part of ABCs, the state gave schools labels with positive 
and negative connotations. Though the specific labels changed over time, examples 
include “Most Improved,” “Expected Growth,” “Honor Schools of Excellence,” 
“Low-performing schools,” and “No Recognition.” The ABCs program also 
provided bonuses to teachers of between $750-1,500 per year based on the growth 
measure, but funding for the bonuses ended after the 2007-08 school year.  
As is more well known, NCLB specified a set of escalating consequences 
for schools if the percent passing did not rise year after year. Schools were said to 
have made or met “adequate yearly progress” (AYP) if the percent of passing 
students was above the year’s target numbers.8 The ambitious yearly AYP targets 
were set under the legislated constraint that 100 percent of students pass by 2013-
7
 In the 2005-06 school year North Carolina was part of a pilot program which allowed the state to 
use a growth measure in their NCLB evaluations. 
8
 Indeed, AYP target numbers were set, and had to be met, for several subgroups of students within 
each school. For example, racial and ethnic groups and different grade levels. 
10 
14, though different states set the slopes of the year AYP functions differently. 
Schools that missed AYP in two consecutive years had to write a plan for 
improvement, and students could transfer to another school. After a third 
consecutive year missing AYP schools had to provide students additional tutoring. 
Missing AYP in four or five consecutive years could lead to firing the school 
faculty and staff, or even simply closing the school.  
Late in the period we study, the some details of the federal and state 
evaluations changed, but the core performance measures remained the same. First, 
starting with the 2011-12 school year, North Carolina received a “NCLB waiver.”9 
Under the waiver, North Carolina’s federal performance measure continued to be 
the percent of students passing, however, the annual targets for schools were reset.10 
Second, in 2012-13 North Carolina introduced READY, a bundle of features 
including revised content standards, tests to accompany the standards, and test-
based evaluation (accountability).11 While the standards and tests changed, the 
evaluation performance measures remained the same: the growth measure and the 
levels measure, now weighted 20/80 respectively. Replacing the descriptive school 
labels were school grades A-F. 
1.2 The retest policy, 2009-2012 
School years 2008-09 through 2011-12 were the “retest years” in North 
Carolina. This subsection describes how evaluation rules during the retest years 
9
 Such waivers were granted liberally, in part because of failed attempts to reauthorize and update 
NCLB as the “100 passing” rule approached for 2013-14. Replacement legislation, known as the 
Every Student Succeeds Act, passed in December 2015. The period we study ends with the 2015-
16 school year. 
10
 The new targets were still ambitious. Schools would be expected to reduce the proportion of 
failing students by half over six years, relative to 2010-11 failure rates. 
11
 The new tests were given five ordered “levels” instead of the prior four. We return to this change 
later in the paper and show that are results are robust to different approaches to dealing with this 
change. Additionally, the math test also changed substantially in 2005-06. Again, later we show that 
our results are robust to different approaches to dealing with test changes. 
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differed from the policies described in the previous subsection. First, as in all other 
years, all students in grades 3-8 were tested annually each spring in math and 
reading. We call this the “initial test score” or the time 𝑡𝑡 score.  
Second, any student who failed the initial test would be retested. 
Empirically, nearly all students (98 percent) who scored “Level II” (failing) on the 
initial test were retested, and zero students who scored “Level III” (passing) were 
retested.12 The retest students took a different form from the same grade-and-
subject level test; in other words, test items for the initial and retest were different 
but drawn from the same item bank. 
Finally, only the higher of a student’s two scores—initial score or retest 
score—would be used to calculate the school performance measures, that is, the 
growth and levels measures described in the prior subsection. Retesting could only 
increase the performance measure used to evaluate schools and teachers.13 
Schools and teachers had approximately 2-3 weeks or more between the 
initial test and retest. During the retest years, the initial test could be given no earlier 
than 22 school days (4.4 five-day weeks) before the end of the school year. Schools 
had some discretion to give the tests later (closer to the end of the year), but not 
earlier. The retest had to occur before the end of the year.14  
While the retest policy was only in place between 2009-2012, there was 
some retesting prior to 2009 but it did not change school and teacher performance 
evaluation measures. The pre-2009 retesting was much more limited: only about 
one-third of districts retested failing students, and then only in grades 3, 5, and 8. 
12
 The state required that all students who scored “Level II” be retested. Students who scored “Level 
I” could be retested, but retesting was not required by the state.  
13
 The change was not misunderstood by the policymakers who made it. Indeed, the state 
Department of Public Instruction warned that ABCs and NCLB measures for 2009-08 and later 
should not be compared to nominally similar measures from before retesting started. The motivation 
for the change seems to have been concerns about test reliability. 
14
 We return to schools’ choices of test dates later in the paper. Before the retest policy in 2009, the 
spring tests would be given no earlier than 15 days before the end of the year. 
12 
Later we show that our results are robust using just the other two-thirds of districts, 
or just grades 4, 6, and 7. The purpose of the pre-2009 retesting was to inform 
decisions about retaining students in grade, not to inform school performance 
measures.15 In section 4 we describe the grade retention policies in more detail, and 
show that are results are not driven by any (potential) grade retention differences at 
the pass/fail cutoff. 
2. Identification strategy
Our empirical objective is to estimate the causal effect of the retest policy 
on student math achievement scores. Our approach is a difference-in-RD, or an 
event study of year-by-year RD estimates. Conceptually, we first obtain a separate 
RD estimate at the pass/fail margin for each school year. Our primary outcome of 
interest is student math test scores one year later; thus, under the conventional RD 
identification assumptions, each year’s RD estimate is the effect of barely failing 
the year 𝑡𝑡 math test on year 𝑡𝑡 + 1 math scores. The effect of failing is not 
necessarily the effect of being retested, if failing brings consequences or 
interventions orthogonal to the retesting policy. By applying a difference-in or 
event study logic to the yearly RD estimates our goal is to difference out any effects 
of these potential other unrelated treatments at the pass/fail cutoff.  
We fit the following specification, and variations on it, by local linear 
regression: 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 +  𝛿𝛿𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 + 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠(𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡),𝑔𝑔(𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡),𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
(1) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the running variable: student 𝑖𝑖’s score on the end-of-year 𝑡𝑡 math test, 
the initial test not the retest. The indicator variable 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 1 if student 𝑖𝑖 received a 
failing score on 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡. The indicator 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = 1 during the four retest policy years, 2009-
15
 Instead of retesting the other two-thirds of districts used just the initial test score and the standard 
error of measurement for that score to inform retention decisions in grades 3, 5, and 8. 
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2012. The term 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠(𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡),𝑔𝑔(𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡),𝑡𝑡 represents fixed effects for each school-by-grade-by-
year cell, which aid in precision. Our primary outcome of interest, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1, is student 𝑖𝑖’s math score one year later. Throughout the paper we cluster standard errors at 
the values of the running variable 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡. 
Notice that equation 1 is a more typical RD specification if the 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 is 
omitted. The 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 allows the (potential) discontinuity at the pass/fail cutoff to be 
different in the non-retest years, 𝛾𝛾, and the retest years, 𝛾𝛾 + 𝛿𝛿. The main effect for 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 is subsumed by the -by-year fixed effects. 
A key choice in any RD analysis is how to model 𝑓𝑓(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡), the relationship 
between the running variable and outcome. In the LLR style, we fit a linear 
relationship which is allowed to be different above and below the pass/fail cutoff, 
i.e., 𝑓𝑓(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) = 𝛼𝛼1𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡. Further, we allow the parameters of 𝑓𝑓(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) to be
different year by year. In practice, as we show below, our estimates are not very 
sensitive to making 𝑓𝑓 more or less flexible. 
The bandwidth for our LLR varies by grade and year, but on average is 9 
scale score points above or below the pass/fail cutoff. Student scores, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, are 
divided into four ordered categories known as “proficiency levels.” Students 
scoring Level I or II fail, and students scoring Level III or IV pass. Thus the cutoff 
between Level II and Level III is the pass/fail cutoff. In our main estimates the LLR 
bandwidth is all scores in Level II or III. We exclude Level I and Level IV because 
the Level I/Level II and Level III/Level IV cutoff (may have) induced other 
discontinuities in potential outcomes. As we show later, our results are robust to 
using smaller bandwidths. 
The key parameter in equation 1 is 𝛿𝛿, the effect of being retested for students 
near the margin of failing the exam (LATE). Strictly speaking we report intent-to-
treat (sharp RD) estimates, though during the retest policy 98 percent of Level II 
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students were retested, and only about 0.1 percent of Level III students were 
retested.  
To interpret our diff-in-RD estimate of 𝛿𝛿 as the causal effect requires a 
weaker assumption than the simple RD. If we only had data from the four retest 
policy years, and thus a conventional RD estimate, we would need the conventional 
RD assumption: (a) that potential outcomes (math scores) are continuous at the 
pass/fail cutoff both with the retest policy and without the policy. Using the diff-
in-RD design we can relax the assumption by adding: (b) however, if there are 
discontinuities in potential outcomes unrelated to the retest policy, those 
discontinuities are constant across the retest years and non-retest periods. Part (b) 
addresses the possibility that the pass/fail cutoff may be used by schools to 
determine other consequences or interventions for students orthogonal to any effect 
of retesting which then in turn may create a discontinuity in potential outcomes at 
the pass/fail cutoff. In section 4 return to the topic of “other interventions,” like 
repeating a grade. In the remainder of this section we report the tests relevant to 
judging part (a), the continuity of potential outcomes at the cutoff. 
In this setting there is little, if any, scope for  manipulating running variable 
scores relative to the cutoff. The running variable is a weighted average of test items 
where the weights are unknown to the student or school; the weights are determined 
by an item response theory (IRT) procedure. In other words, students and schools 
cannot rely on a simple rule like: answer n out of N items correctly and you will 
pass. The pass/fail cutoff is set by the state and does not change from year to year.16 
16
 A pass/fail cutoff is specific to grade level, subject, and test design. During the period we study 
there are three math test designs: one used up through 2005, one used from 2006 through 2012, and 
a third used from 2013 forward. So, for example, the pass/fail cutoff for the 2006-2012 test was 
determined in 2006 and remained fixed, notably constant over the years just before and during the 
retest policy. Test items change from year to year, but IRT methods link item weights over time to 
keep scale scores and cutoffs constant. 
15 
Consistent with the institutional details, empirically we find no evidence of 
manipulation. Appendix Figure 1 is a histogram of the forcing variable centered at 
the pass/fail cutoff; the distribution appears smooth with no visible extra (missing) 
density above (below) the cutoff. The McCrary test statistic is -0.008 (st.err. 0.002), 
quite a small difference in density but statistically significant at conventional levels 
partly given substantial power.  
As complementary evidence, Table 1 reports covariate balance style tests 
for several student characteristics. For example, there is no discontinuity at the 
pass/fail cutoff for students prior (𝑡𝑡 − 1) math test scores. Column 1 shows 
estimated difference in the non-retest years, 𝛾𝛾� = −0.004𝜎𝜎, and column 2 shows 
the diff-in-RD estimate for the retest years, 𝛿𝛿 = 0.003𝜎𝜎; both come from 
estimating equation 1 where the dependent variable is 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1. Students are also 
balanced on prior reading scores, retention in grade, absences, etc. Of the nine 
student characteristics tested, two show statistically significant differences for 𝛿𝛿: 
female and special education status. 
3. Main estimates
The retest policy generates improvements in the future math scores of 
retested students. Students who barely fail the initial end-of-year test (time 𝑡𝑡)—and 
thus are retested 2-3 weeks later—score 0.03σ higher one year later (𝑡𝑡 + 1) 
compared to otherwise-identical students who barely passed at time 𝑡𝑡. These 
differences at the pass/fail cutoff occur during the four years of the retest policy, 
but not in the years before or after. 
Figure 1 shows the event study of RD estimates. Each square is an RD point 
estimate for a given school year. These estimates are obtained by fitted equation 1, 
but interacting 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 with year indicators instead of 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡. (The omitted year is 2008.) 
There is no trend in pass/fail differences in the years leading up to the retest policy. 
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However, the retest years, 2009-2012, are a clear deviation from that prior trend. 
The difference between the retest years and prior years appears to be between 0.02-
0.03σ. The retest years are also clearly different from the post years, though the 
post years also appear different from the pre years. The post years may be partly 
explained by a change in the math test, which discuss below with other robustness 
tests.  
Figure 2 is a rough visual representation of specification 1. For each value 
of the running variable (𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 in scale score units), square markers represent the mean 
outcome score (𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 in student standard deviations) net of grade-by-year-by-
school fixed effects. Fitted lines are estimated using the underlying student-by-year 
data. There is a visible discontinuity in the retest years (left column, solid squares). 
The discontinuity is easier to see in the lower row where we “zoom in” to a smaller 
x-axis range; the marker means and fitted slopes are identical in the upper and lower 
rows. By contrast, there is no apparent discontinuity at the pass/fail cutoff in the 
non-retest years (right column, hollow squares). Nevertheless, our diff-in-RD 
estimate take account of any discontinuity in the non-retest years even if it is 
difficult to see in the picture. 
The main diff-in-RD estimates are shown in the top row of Table 2. In the 
non-retest years, there is little difference at the pass/fail cutoff. The RD estimate 𝛾𝛾 
from equation 1 is -0.002 (st.err. 0.008). In the retest years, the pass/fail difference 
increases by 0.031 (st.err. 0.005), which is our estimate of 𝛿𝛿 in equation 1. Thurs, 
during the retest years students who barely failed scored 𝛾𝛾 + 𝛿𝛿 = 0.029σ higher 
than they would have if they had barely passed.17 
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 The estimates in Table 1 row 1 (and similarly other estimates in the paper) come from a single 
regression fitting specification 1. An alternative two-step approach is to, first, estimate 13 year-
specific RD point estimates, like the 13 shown in Figure 1. Then, second, estimate a bivariate 
regression with 13 observations where the depended variable is the year-specific RD estimate from 
step one, and the dependent variable is an indicator = 1 for the 4 retest years. Using this alternative 
approach, our point estimate is 0.030 (st.err. 0.004), nearly identical to the one-regression approach. 
17 
Is the difference of 0.03σ large or small? It is small as a share of the total 
variation in student math scores, but larger in context. First, consider 0.03 in the 
context of a teacher’s total contribution to student test scores, assuming the gain 
comes through an increase in teacher effort. One standard deviation of the teacher 
effort (“value-added”) distribution is typically estimated to be between 0.10-0.20σ 
(Hanushek and Rivkin 2010, Jackson, Rockoff, and Staiger 2014), making our 
estimated effect equivalent to 15-30 percent of the between-teacher variation.  
A second relevant comparison is other estimates of the returns to quantity 
of instruction. If our estimated effect is due to teaching during the 2-3 weeks 
between the initial and retest, then it is relatively large compared to other estimates. 
Sims (2008) and Aucejo and Romano (2016) estimate the benefit of adding 1 week 
before the end-of-year test, finding 0.03σ and 0.02σ respectively. Raudenbush, 
Reardon, and Nomi (2012) and Taylor (2014) estimate the benefit of doubling a 
student’s math class time for an entire year, finding 0.21σ for grade 9 students and 
0.17σ for grade 6-8 students respectively. On the school calendar, 2-3 weeks 
represents approximately 6-8 percent of the year. 
Finally, before turning to mechanisms, we briefly show that our results are 
robust to a number of critical estimation choices. The robustness test results are 
shown in the remaining rows of Table 2.  Our main specification allows the slope 
parameters of 𝑓𝑓(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) to differ year by year. The treatment effect estimate is 
essentially unchanged if we make 𝑓𝑓(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) more or less flexible, i.e., allowing the 
parameters to differ for each grade-by-year cell, or only allowing them to differ for 
the binary retest and non-retest periods. Our estimates are also robust to using all 
of the within grade-by-year variation, instead of the within school-by-grade-by-
year variation in our preferred specification. 
Critically given the RD LLR feature of our approach, our effect estimates 
are not sensitive to bandwidth choice. For example, using just one-quarter of our 
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preferred bandwidth, the diff-in-RD estimate is 0.028σ; one-quarter is 
approximately 2-3 scale score points on either side of the cutoff. 
The bottom two rows of Table 2 show estimates restricting the years used 
in estimation. Our results are essentially unchanged if we us only data from 𝑡𝑡 = 
2006 through 2012. This is the period over which there was no change in the math 
test design; a new test was introduced in 2013 and an older test was used until 2005. 
Similarly, our results are unchanged if we use only the retest years and pre-retest 
years, 𝑡𝑡 = 2003 through 2012. Figure 1 suggests some additional change may have 
occurred post the retest years.18  
4. Mechanisms
In this section we discuss evidence (in)consistent with different potential 
mechanisms for the retest policy’s effects we documented above. Together the 
evidence suggests the effects arose because teachers (schools) changed their effort 
in response to the new, sharp incentives in their evaluation measure. We show 
evidence that the effects are not the result of retesting per se, nor the result of 
changes in students’ own effort or behavior. It appears most likely that teacher 
(school) effort changed primarily during the 2-3 weeks before to the retest, at least 
more likely than changes in the subsequent school year. 
18
 One possibility is the following: Beginning with 2014, the four proficiency levels were expanded 
to five levels. The old pre-2014 Level II was subdivided into two levels, and the ordered level 
numbers were adjusted accordingly. Thus, the new pass/fail cutoff was between new “Level III” 
and new “Level IV.” For our analysis, we convert the new five levels back to the old four levels 
simply by collapsing new Level II and new Level III back into a single old Level II.  
There was no retest policy in 2014, and so we do not know for certain whether the correct 
counterfactual would have been to apply retesting at the new Level III/new Level IV cutoff, as we 
assume in our analysis, or at the new Level II/new Level III cutoff. We have replicated our results 
using the latter assumption. In Figure 1, only the 2014 and 2015 points change, of course, and in 
this alternative those two points are closer to zero and their 95 percent confidence intervals include 
zero. 
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We begin with a result that emphasizes the difference between retesting per 
se and the retesting policy. There was some retesting in North Carolina prior to the 
start of the retest policy in 2009. Importantly, however, the pre-2009 retest scores 
were not used in calculating performance measures for teacher and school 
evaluation. Recall that under the retest policy, from 2009-2012, only the higher of 
a student’s initial score and retest score would be used in teacher (school) 
evaluation measures. The prior retesting, but with quite different stakes for 
teachers, provides a convenient empirical test which we construct in this subsection. 
First we need to explain a few institutional details. Prior to 2009 retesting 
was mechanically similar but more limited in scope. Similar to the 2009-2012 
policy, students who failed the initial test would be retested a few weeks later, 
though there were fewer school days between the initial and retest pre-2009.19 
However, pre-2009 retesting was limited to grades 3, 5, and 8 only. The retesting 
was intended to help schools make decisions about which students to retain in 
grade, and the state policies about grade retention applied only to grade 3, 5, and 8. 
Moreover, districts could choose one of two rules about whom to retest: (1) 
Districts could simply retest failing students. This would become the rule for all 
districts in the retest policy years. Or (2) districts could adopt the “SEM rule.” If a 
student failed, but their failing score was within one standard error of measurement 
(SEM) below the pass/fail cutoff, then the student did not need to be retested. Such 
students could be treated as effectively having passed for purposes of grade 
retention decisions. 
If retesting per se drove the effects, then the start of the retesting policy in 
2009 would no change student outcomes in grades 3, 5, and 8 in districts which 
were retesting prior to 2009. Here “no change” is equivalent to null hypothesis of 
19
 During the retest policy years schools had to conduct both the initial test and retest in the final 22 
school days of the year. Prior to 2009 the testing window was the final 15 school days. 
4.1 Retesting per se versus the retest policy 
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𝛿𝛿 = 0 for the diff-in-RD. We test this prediction in Table 3 row 1.20 The diff-in-
RD estimate is 0.034 (st.err. 0.010), quite similar to our main estimate. 
Additionally, we should also expect a positive 𝛾𝛾 if retesting per se had benefits, but 
the estimate of 𝛾𝛾 in row 1 is -0.007 (st.err. 0.013). In short, for this sample retesting 
was a constant across all the years, and what changed in 2009 was how the retest 
scores affected teachers’ (schools’) evaluation measure; that change in 2009 
induced changes in student outcomes.  
For completeness, rows 2-4 of Table 3 are results for the other three possible 
combinations of grade level group and district retesting rule. Each of these three is 
also similar to the main effect estimate.  
This pattern of results strongly suggests teachers (schools) changed their 
effort in response to the retest policy, specifically features of the retest policy other 
than the act of retesting failing students. One relevant feature—perhaps the only 
relevant feature—was the change in how retest scores were used to calculate 
teacher (school) evaluation measures. 
4.2 Student effort or behavior 
We now shift focus to the students themselves. One category of potential 
mechanism is changes in student effort or behavior. Student and teacher effort 
changes are not mutually exclusive mechanisms. Indeed, teacher contributions to 
student outcomes include teachers inducing their students to give more effort.  
One specific hypothesis is that students may find being retested distasteful 
and give more effort in the future to avoid being retested again. This hypothesis 
could be true even if there is no change in teacher effort. We do not find any 
evidence consistent with this hypothesis. First, the results using pre-2009 retesting 
20
 In Table 3 rows 1-4 we limit the sample to 𝑡𝑡 = 2003 through 2012. We exclude the post period 
because there was no retesting. The results are substantively no different if we use all years in the 
data. 
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differences (Table 3 rows 1-4) are largely inconsistent with this hypothesis. If 
students feared being retested, they should fear it before and after 2009. It is 
possible that before 2009 students retested in grade 3 or 5 knew that there was no 
chance of being retested in grade 4 or 6 and thus they did not need to give extra 
effort on the 𝑡𝑡 + 1 test. 
We have one more-direct but imperfect measure of student effort: absences 
from school. Table 4 row 1 shows results where the outcome measure is changed 
from test score at the end of year 𝑡𝑡 + 1 to absences during year 𝑡𝑡 + 1. The diff-in-
RD point estimate is a reduction in absences, but only 0.013 days, and far from 
statistically significant. 
If students did change their effort to avoid being retested in the future, we 
might expect effects to be correlated with grade level. Older students may be more 
aware of retesting rules, or younger students may be less likely to shirk in the first 
place. We find no evidence effects are correlated with grade. Table 3 rows 5-9 
provide estimates by grade. We can reject equality in some pairwise grade 
comparisons, but there is no monotonic relationship between grade and estimated 
effect. 
Additionally, if students did fear being retested the following year, we might 
expect their increased effort to show up in other tests. Table 4 row 2 shows 
estimates where the outcome variable is reading/language arts score at 𝑡𝑡 + 1, but 
the RD remains the math pass/fail cutoff. The point estimate is positive and 
marginally statistically significant, but an order of magnitude smaller than the main 
effect for math score.  
One final hypothesis is about students learning from the experience of 
sitting for an additional test. Suppose simply by taking the retest students 
strengthened their general test-taking skills, knowledge of specific test item types, 
etc. Retested students would thus have an advantage over their peers who passed 
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and were not retested. This hypothesis is also contradicted by the results using pre-
2009 retesting. 
4.3 The weeks before the retest versus the subsequent school year 
Incentives were clear and strong during the weeks between the initial and 
retest: effort directed at to-be-retested students could only improve the teacher 
(school) evaluation measure. However, our outcome, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1, is only measured at 
the end of the subsequent school year, some 11 months after the retest. Thus, it is 
possible that our estimated effects, 0.03σ, arose (partly) because students who 
barely failed or barely passed the initial end-of-year 𝑡𝑡 test were treated differently 
the following school year.  
To explain the discontinuous jump in outcomes at the time 𝑡𝑡 cutoff, any 
other candidate explanation—like a treatment during year 𝑡𝑡 + 1—would also need 
to change discontinuously at the 𝑡𝑡 cutoff. For example, studying data from Miami 
schools, Taylor (2014) finds that middle-school students who barely fail the year 𝑡𝑡 
math test are assigned to lower level math courses the for year 𝑡𝑡 + 1 and have 
lower-achieving classmates; these “tracking” patterns are not required by any 
policy. In the current setting, we also see evidence that the pass/fail cutoff affects 
future peer, and perhaps teacher, assignments. Importantly, however, these 
discontinuities in peer (teacher) assignment existed absent the retest policy and do 
not change under the policy. In Table 4 row 3 the outcome measure is the mean 
prior math achievement, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, of student 𝑖𝑖’s math classmates in year 𝑡𝑡 + 1; row 4 is 
the proportion of 𝑡𝑡 + 1 classmates who failed the 𝑡𝑡 test; and row 5 is the value-
added score of student 𝑖𝑖’s year 𝑡𝑡 + 1 math teacher. There are some (marginally) 
significant differences in column 1, but the diff-in-RD estimates are zero.  
The retest policy effects are not explained by grade retention differences. In 
Table 4 row 6 the outcome is an indicator = 1 if student 𝑖𝑖 is retained in grade, that 
23 
is, student 𝑖𝑖 is assigned the same grade level in year 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑡𝑡 + 1. As with the 
teachers and peer variables, we find no difference in discontinuity in the probability 
of being retained at the cutoff.  
Differences in grade retention are, perhaps, a more plausible explanation 
than differences in tracking or teacher effectiveness because there is a relevant 
explicit policy. In 2009 and the years before, the state of North Carolina required 
that a student failing the end-of-year test must be “a factor” in the school’s decision 
about whether to retain the student in grade. While failing was nominally a factor, 
as shown in Table 4 row 5 the empirical discontinuity is small. Two additional 
results are evidence against retention as a mechanism for our estimated effects. 
First, the state retention policy only applied to grades 3, 5 and 8. As shown in Table 
3 the effects are not limited to those retention policy grades, nor limited to districts 
who used the SEM rule in pre-2009 retention decisions. Second, the state’s 
retention policy ended after 2010. As shown in Figure 1, the retest policy effects 
continue in 2011 and 2012.21 Additionally, our effect estimates do not covary with 
how districts’ retention behavior changed after the end of the state policy 
(Appendix Table 1).22 
Students may have been treated differently by their teachers and schools in 
ways we cannot observe in the data. Whether observed or unobserved, however, 
this type of mechanism requires that barely failing students be treated differently 
than barely passing students simply because of their “passed” or “failed” status or 
label.  
21
 The end of the policy was officially approved on October 7, 2010, approximately six weeks into 
the 2010-11 school year. The policy change explicitly allowed schools to reverse the retention 
decisions for 2010-11 they had made previously. 
22
 For each district we estimate the discontinuity in retention probability at the pass/fail cutoff before 
and after the 2010 state policy change. Then we divide districts into terciles of the change in the 
discontinuity point estimate; roughly districts who retained barely failing students more, districts 
with no change, and districts who retained barely failing students less. We find no different in effects 
across these three groups. 
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Hypotheses which rely on a student’s pass/fail status per se changing her 
treatment in the subsequent school year are unlikely to explain our estimated retest 
policy effect. First, among students who barely failed the initial test, nearly two 
thirds (62 percent) passed the retest (Table 5 column 3). In other words, in the 
population to whom our LATE RD estimate applies, most students ended the school 
year having a label of “passed.” This would substantially weaken any differences 
in future decisions by teachers or schools made on the basis of pass/fail status.  
Nevertheless, many students failed again on the retest. Perhaps 0.03σ is 
simply a weighted average = (0.62)0 + (0.38)0.08, where failing the retest is the 
critical variable which triggers different treatment of the student in the subsequent 
school year. We test this hypothesis using RD methods to estimate the effect of 
barely failing the retest, compared to barely passing the retest, among the students 
who barely failed the initial test.  
As shown in Table 5 column 1, we find no difference in the year 𝑡𝑡 + 1 test 
scores of students who barely failed or barely passed the retest. In other words, our 
key outcome is not influenced by pass/fail status of the retest, but is influenced by 
pass/fail status of the initial test. This is consistent with teachers (schools) who 
react to the retest cutoff—and its strong evaluation incentives—but not other 
seemingly similar cutoffs. This result holds for students near the cutoff on the initial 
test, who are in the LATE population our main RD estimates apply to. Moving 
further away from the initial test cutoff, there is some evidence that students who 
fail the retest may be worse off, if anything.  
A final test uses value-added-style estimates of teachers’ contributions to 
retest scores. We first produce a “value added to retest” estimate for a given teacher 𝑗𝑗 using conventional value-added methods, except that the dependent variable is 
the difference between student 𝑖𝑖’s retest and initial scores (both from the same year 
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𝑡𝑡).23 In the second step we regress student 𝑖𝑖’s test score from the following year, 𝑡𝑡 + 1, on the “value added to retest” score of student 𝑖𝑖’s year 𝑡𝑡 teacher.24 In other 
words, we test whether teacher contributions to retest scores persist and predict 
student scores one year later. The final feature of this test uses the fact that retesting 
occurred before the retest policy began in 2009, as detailed above. In the second 
step regression we interact the “value added to retest” score with an indicator for 
the retest policy years.25 In other words, we test whether the nature of teacher’s 
contributions to retest scores changed when the policy changed.  
The results of this test are consistent with two conclusions. Detailed results 
are shown in Appendix Table 2. First, teachers do make contributions to their 
student’s retest scores beyond their contributions to initial scores; estimates of those 
contributions predict students’ future test scores. If a teacher induces a 0.10σ 
improvement between initial and retest, her students are predicted to score 
approximately 0.026-0.035σ higher the following year. Second, the retest policy 
changed the nature of teachers’ contributions to retest scores. The coefficient on 
prior teacher’s “value added to retest” increases by about 15-25 percent in the retest 
policy years. 
The evidence presented thus far suggests the retest policy effects were the 
result of teachers’ (schools’) actions during the weeks leading up to the retest.26 
23
 We fit a specification where the dependent variable is retest minus initial score for student 𝑖𝑖 in 
year 𝑡𝑡, and the right hand side has: student 𝑖𝑖’s lagged math score, student demographic 
characteristics, student absences, and teacher fixed effects. The estimated teacher fixed effects are 
our “value added to retest” measure.  
24
 This second step specification also includes fixed effects for year 𝑡𝑡 + 1 teacher, and controls for 
student demographics and absences, and student 𝑖𝑖’s initial test score from year 𝑡𝑡. 
25
 Data on retest scores prior to the retest policy are available for only one year, 2008; and, as 
described above, for only grades 3 and 5 given the retesting rules before the retest policy. Thus our 
“pre” period is limited to 𝑡𝑡 = 2008. We limit the post period to 2009 for balance. 
26
 Changes in teacher effort or decisions need not be changes by individual teachers independent of 
other teachers. For example, perhaps the teachers in a school decided to place all to-be-retested 
students in an ad-hoc remedial class, and then assigned the “best” math teacher to teach that ad-hoc 
class. This is still a change in effort, though a reallocation across teachers rather than simply within 
a teacher. 
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Whatever those actions were their effects persisted for at least a year and showed 
up on the 𝑡𝑡 + 1 test score, and so students presumably learned something during 
those 2-3 weeks. An additional piece of evidence consistent some learning is that 
students’ retest scores are better predictors of their 𝑡𝑡 + 1 score than are their initial 
scores.27  
What did retested students learn in those weeks? We cannot say for certain 
given the data available. The answer could be math skills, or test taking skills, or 
both; as long as those skills were valuable to next year’s math test.28 Moreover, 
math skills and test taking skills are not disjoint sets.29 Whatever students learned, 
however, the resulting discontinuity in students’ 𝑡𝑡 + 1 scores is consistent with 
teachers distorting their effort in response to the incentives of their evaluation 
measure.  
4.4 School choices of test dates 
One final complementary piece of evidence comes from the test dates 
chosen by schools. As we show in this subsection, before the retest policy schools 
with a higher proportion of failing students set their test date later in the window. 
But during the retest years the pattern goes away with such schools setting their test 
dates just as early as higher performing schools. Moving up the test date is 
consistent with schools which (plan to) make good use of the time before the retest. 
27
 We estimate two simple bivariate regressions using only observations on Level II retested students 
from 2009-2012. For the regression of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 on the initial score (𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) the R-squared is 0.11. For 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 on the retest score the R-squared is 0.21.  
28
 Our understanding is that teachers and schools did not have information about which specific test 
items students missed on the initial test, and thus could not use that information in their teaching 
before the retest. 
29
 Koretz (2017) provides examples of test taking skills which overlap with math skills. Students 
can be coached to score higher based on knowing things like: (a) 3:4:5 and 5:12:13 are the most 
common Pythagorean triples used in test items, and (b) 𝑦𝑦 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝑏𝑏 is the most common 
representation of a simple linear equation used in test items. Knowing only 3:4:5 is not the same as 
fully understanding the Pythagorean Theorem, but knowing that 3:4:5 characterizes a right angle is 
a useful math skill, ask any carpenter.  
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After the retest policy ended, schools switched back. These choices are further 
evidence that teachers and schools understood and acted on the incentives created 
by the retest policy. 
The relevant institutional details for this empirical test are as follows: The 
state of North Carolina sets a testing “window”; schools then choose which day, 
within that window, they will have their students take the test. Both the initial test 
and the retest had to occur during the window. During the retest policy years, 2009-
2012, the window was the last 22 school days of the year. In the years before 2009, 
the window was the last 15 days.30 
We estimate the following specification: 𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹�𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹�𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 + 𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 
(2) 
where 𝐹𝐹�𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡−1 is the school proportion of students failing the math exam the prior 
year, and 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = 1 for the retest years. Recall that 𝐹𝐹�𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡−1 is quite similar to the 
performance evaluation measures schools faced under NCLB and ABCs (see 
Section 1). The outcome variable, 𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0,1], is constructed so that if school 𝑠𝑠 
chooses to test on the first day of the window 𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 0, and 𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 is the proportion of 
the test window elapsed before the chosen test date. We also include non-parametric 
year controls, 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡, and cluster standard errors at the school level. 
In Table 6 column 1 we show estimates fitting specification 2 but limiting 
the data to two years before and after the change (2007-2010). First, prior to the 
retest policy, a school with more failing students set their test dates later in the 
window (row 1). For example, a school with 10 points more failing in 𝑡𝑡 − 1 set its 
test date 1.3 percentage points further into the test window in year 𝑡𝑡. This average 
difference is not large, perhaps one-fifth of a day, but is statistically significant. 
30
 For 2013 the window reverted to 15 days, and beginning in 2014 the window was 10 days. 
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Second, after the retest policy begins in 2009 the correlation between the proportion 
of failing students and test date essentially goes to zero.  
When the retest policy ended after 2012, the patterns of test date choices 
reverted to what we observed in the pre-policy period, though perhaps slightly 
weaker. In column 2 we fit specification 2 limiting to two years before and after the 
end of the policy (2010-2014).  
We test the robustness of these results in two ways. First, we simply pool 
all of the pre, during, and post retest years in column 3. The pattern of results is 
unchanged. Second, we fit specification 2 using placebo policy changes in columns 
4 and 5. We find no changes in test date decisions at these placebo years. 
5. Conclusion
Evaluation can change employee effort and decisions in both intended and 
unintended ways. In this paper we describe an empirical example of an unintended 
change; a distortion in teacher effort. The distortion occurs because teachers must 
allocate effort across many students (tasks), but the evaluation measure weights 
those students differently. An example of the multitask evaluation problem 
described by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).  
 Our paper is subtly but meaningfully different from prior papers which also 
document changes in teacher effort allocations across students. In Neal and 
Schanzenbach (2010), for example, a new evaluation system caused teachers to 
give more attention to students in the middle of the achievement distribution, and 
less attention to students higher (and lower) in the distribution. That change, 
however, was at least partly intended by the evaluation system, and depended on 
students’ prior achievement.  
In contrast, we document a case where students who are educationally 
identical (at expectation) ended up with different outcomes because of the 
evaluation system’s incentives. Students who barely failed the end of year test, and 
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were later retested, were better off than their classmates who barely passed. Here 
“better off” is scoring higher on the state math test one year later. The barely failing 
students were no more or less deserving of their teachers’ effort than were the 
barely passing, and no more or less likely to benefit from that effort. Barely failing 
students would have no higher or lower demand for their teachers’ effort, at least 
absent being labeled “failing” by the test. In other words, the regression 
discontinuity difference we estimate is inconsistent with the notion that teachers are 
perfectly motivated agents whose decisions are invariant to performance 
evaluation. 
The estimated effects on student test scores are most likely the result of 
teachers (schools) response to the retest policy’s evaluation incentives. To reiterate 
those incentives: Effort directed at students who failed the initial test would 
unambiguously increase the teacher’s (school’s) performance measure, because 
only the higher of a student’s initial and retest score would be used to calculate the 
measure. Effort directed at otherwise-identical passing students, however, would 
not change the performance measure. Our regression discontinuity estimate of the 
resulting benefit to barely failing students is approximately 0.03σ. That difference 
occurs only in the retest policy years, but not before or after. Additionally, the 
difference is not the result of retesting per se the data suggest. In the years before 
the retest policy began in 2009 failing students in select grades and districts were 
retested, but those pre-2009 retest scores were not used in the teacher and school 
evaluation measures. For those select grades and districts the retest policy only 
changed how retest scores would be used to judge the adults, and we find the same 
effects of the retest policy. Several other changes, or lack of changes, we observe 
in the student and school behavior are also consistent with a distortion in teacher 
and school decisions.  
These results emphasize the importance of careful design in employee 
performance evaluation systems. The particulars of this paper’s setting—especially 
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the student-level discontinuity and the variation in retest policy over time—are 
empirically advantageous for demonstrating distortion from evaluation. But the 
broader concern about distortionary incentives is more general. Evaluation 
designers—like legislators, superintendents, principals, and unions in the schools 
setting—would do well to think explicitly about the implicit incentives.   
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Figure 1—Estimated (RD) effect of failing math on next year’s math score; 
before, during (2009-2012), and after the retest policy 
Note: Each hollow square represents, for a given school year (x-axis = 𝑡𝑡), the estimated effect of 
failing the end-of-year 𝑡𝑡 math test on math test score at 𝑡𝑡 + 1 for students near the pass/fail cutoff, 
measured in student standard deviation units (y-axis). Each hollow square is a regression 
discontinuity (RD) estimate using the local linear regression methods described in the text. Vertical 
lines represent the 95 percent confidence interval for each RD estimate. All estimates are relative to 
2008. 
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Figure 2—Initial math test scores and scores one year later 
Note: Each square represents the mean outcome math score, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1, in student standard deviation 
units (y-axis) for students with a given initial test scale score (x-axis), net of grade-by-year-by-
school fixed effects. Filled squares are pooling retest policy years. Hollow squares are pooling non-
retest policy years. Fitted lines are by OLS using data at the student-year observation level. The first 
and second rows are identical, except that in the second row the x-axis range is smaller to aid in 
visibility of the discontinuity; the square values and fitted line slopes are identical. 
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Table 1—Covariate balance 
RD estimate of 
difference at 
pass/fail cutoff 
Difference-in-
RD estimate 
Pre-treatment covariate 
Non-retest 
years 
Retest years − 
Non-retest 
years Observations 
(1) (2) (3) 
Math score, t-1 -0.004 0.003 3,695,517 
(0.004) (0.009) 
Reading score, t-1 -0.002 -0.001 3,661,258 
(0.004) (0.005) 
Retained in year t 0.000 0.000 3,674,709 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Female 0.002 -0.008** 3,691,893 
(0.002) (0.003) 
White -0.001 0.001 3,691,893 
(0.001) (0.002) 
Days absent 0.043 0.072 3,686,276 
(0.041) (0.049) 
Free or reduced lunch 0.005* -0.004 3,276,286 
(0.002) (0.004) 
Special education -0.009** 0.012** 3,276,286 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Limited English 0.001+ 0.001 3,684,301 
   proficiency (0.001) (0.002) 
Note: Each row reports estimates from a separate local linear regression with student-by-year 
observations. Each dependent variable is a pre-treatment student characteristic, and is described in 
the row label. The specification is the difference-in-RD described in detail in the text. The right-
hand-side has separate linear terms for the running variable (initial math test score in year 𝑡𝑡) above 
and below the cutoff, and the slopes are allowed to differ in the retest policy years versus non-retest 
years. The specification also includes school-by-grade-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the values of the running variable. Free or reduced lunch and special 
education data not available for 2004 and 2005. 
+ indicates p<0.10, * 0.05, and ** 0.01 
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Table 2—Difference-in-RD estimates and robustness tests 
RD estimate of 
difference at 
pass/fail cutoff 
Difference-in-
RD estimate 
Non-retest 
years 
Retest years − 
Non-retest 
years Observations 
(1) (2) (3) 
Main estimate -0.002 0.031** 3,978,190 
(0.008) (0.005) 
Alternative specifications 
   𝑓𝑓(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) parameters by retest 0.006 0.024** 3,978,190 
      years v. non-retest years (0.007) (0.007) 
   𝑓𝑓(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) parameters by grade-by-year 0.002 0.030** 3,978,190 
(0.009) (0.005) 
   Grade-by-year FE -0.002 0.033** 3,978,190 
(0.009) (0.005) 
Alternative bandwidths 0.024** 0.028** 1,028,410 
   1/4 (0.001) (0.002) 
0.011+ 0.033** 2,085,368 
   1/2 (0.006) (0.006) 
0.006 0.031** 3,009,167 
   3/4 (0.006) (0.005) 
Only 2006-2012, no change 0.005 0.025** 2,430,907 
   in math test (0.010) (0.005) 
Note: Each row reports estimates from a separate local linear regression with student-by-year 
observations. For the main estimate in row 1: The dependent variable is the student’s standardized 
math test score in year 𝑡𝑡 + 1. The specification is a difference-in-RD. The right-hand-side has 
separate linear terms for the running variable (initial math test score in year 𝑡𝑡) above and below the 
cutoff, and the slopes are allowed to differ in each year as in Figure 1. The specification also includes 
school-by-grade-by-year fixed effects. For rows 2 through the end: The estimation details are 
identical to row 1, except for the variation(s) describe in the row headers. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the values of the running variable. 
+ indicates p<0.10, * 0.05, and ** 0.01 
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Table 3—Retesting before 2009 and grade level estimates 
RD estimate of 
difference at 
pass/fail cutoff 
Difference-in-
RD estimate 
Non-retest 
years 
Retest years − 
Non-retest 
years Observations 
(1) (2) (3) 
Grades 3 and 5; retesting before 2009 
   District retested at pass/fail -0.007 0.034** 459,461 
      cutoff in 3, 5, and 8 (0.013) (0.010) 
   District used SEM rule -0.009 0.029** 798,773 
(0.009) (0.008) 
Grades 4, 6, and 7; no retesting before 2009  
   District retested at pass/fail 0.022* 0.018** 657,417 
      cutoff in 3, 5, and 8 (0.010) (0.006) 
   District used SEM rule 0.015 0.018** 1,156,740 
(0.010) (0.006) 
Grade level 
   3 -0.008 0.033** 859,919 
(0.013) (0.007) 
   4 0.014 0.016** 782,929 
(0.013) (0.005) 
   5 -0.013+ 0.036** 785,195 
(0.007) (0.005) 
   6 0.002 0.025* 778,896 
(0.011) (0.012) 
   7 0.016* 0.040** 771,251 
(0.006) (0.010) 
Note: Each row reports estimates from a separate local linear regression with student-by-year 
observations. The estimation details are identical to Table 2 row 1 (the main estimate), except the 
estimation sample is restricted to subsamples as defined in the row headers. In all rows the 
specification is a difference-in-RD. The right-hand-side has separate linear terms for the running 
variable (initial math test score in year 𝑡𝑡) above and below the cutoff, and the slopes are allowed to 
differ in each year as in Figure 1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the values of the 
running variable. 
+ indicates p<0.10, * 0.05, and ** 0.01 
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Table 4—Alternative dependent variables 
RD estimate of 
difference at 
pass/fail cutoff 
Difference-in-
RD estimate 
Non-retest 
years 
Retest years − 
Non-retest 
years Observations 
(1) (2) (3) 
Absences in year t+1 0.010 -0.013 3,928,054 
(0.018) (0.032) 
Reading test score t+1 0.001 0.006+ 3,933,249 
(0.004) (0.003) 
Mean year t score of t+1 peers 0.010* -0.001 1,941,699 
(0.005) (0.003) 
Proportion t+1 peers failed t test 0.026** -0.001 1,941,699 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Value-added score of t+1 teacher 0.002+ -0.001 1,676,408 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Retained (same grade t and t+1) 0.003** 0.000 3,212,750 
(0.001) (0.000) 
Note: Each row reports estimates from a separate local linear regression with student-by-year 
observations. The estimation details are identical to Table 2 row 1 (the main estimate), except with 
an alternative dependent variable described in the row headers. In all rows the specification is a 
difference-in-RD. The right-hand-side has separate linear terms for the running variable (initial math 
test score in year 𝑡𝑡) above and below the cutoff, and the slopes are allowed to differ in each year as 
in Figure 1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the values of the running variable. 
+ indicates p<0.10, * 0.05, and ** 0.01 
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Table 5—Retest scores 
Scale score 
points below 
pass/fail 
cutoff 
RD est. diff. at 
pass/fail cutoff Proportion 
passing on 
retest 
Mean 
improvement 
retest-initial 
Retest 
years Observations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1 -0.001 60,377 0.616 0.164 
(0.009) 
2 0.005 58,079 0.521 0.157 
(0.009) 
3 0.006 48,690 0.435 0.159 
(0.010) 
4 -0.013 45,465 0.361 0.171 
(0.011) 
5 -0.023+ 40,144 0.289 0.180 
(0.012) 
6 -0.022 34,668 0.233 0.199 
(0.015) 
7 -0.009 32,260 0.183 0.216 
(0.021) 
8 -0.036+ 26,732 0.144 0.240 
(0.021) 
9 -0.040+ 26,096 0.105 0.250 
(0.024) 
10 -0.061+ 16,763 0.081 0.274 
(0.034) 
Note: In each row, column 1 reports a regression discontinuity estimate from a separate local linear 
regression with student-by-year observations. The dependent variable is the student’s standardized 
math test score in year 𝑡𝑡 + 1. In contrast to other estimates in the paper, the running variable is the 
student’s retest score. The right-hand-side has separate linear terms for the running variable above 
and below the cutoff. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the values of the running 
variable. Row 1 is estimated using the sample of students who scored 1 scale score point below the 
pass/fail cutoff on the initial 𝑡𝑡 test, row 2 for the sample 2 points below, and so on. Column 3 reports 
the proportion of students who passed on the retest, i.e., scored above the pass/fail cutoff on the 
retest. Column 4 reports the mean difference between retest score and initial score. 
+ indicates p<0.10, * 0.05, and ** 0.01 
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Table 6—School initial test date choice  
Dep. var. = proportion of test window elapsed before test date (0 on first day, 1 on last) 
Years used in estimation 
2007-
2010 
2011-
2014 
All 
years 
2005-
2008 
2009-
2012 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Proportion failing t-1 0.133** 0.084** 0.108** 0.109+ -0.005 
(0.028) (0.025) (0.020) (0.056) (0.024) 
Proportion failing t-1 -0.138** -0.072* -0.105** 
* Retest years 2009-2012 (0.029) (0.029) (0.022) 
Proportion failing t-1 0.024 
* Placebo years 2007-2008 (0.054) 
Proportion failing t-1 0.017 
* Placebo years 2011-2012 (0.023) 
School-by-year observations 6,444 6,612 17,050 5,720 6,801 
Note: Each column reports estimates from a separate least squares regression. The dependent 
variable is the proportion of the test window elapsed before the date on which the test was given by 
school 𝑠𝑠 in year 𝑡𝑡. The right-hand-side includes the regressors show above and year fixed effects. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level.  
+ indicates p<0.10, * 0.05, and ** 0.01 
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Online Appendix 
Appendix Figure 1—Histogram of end-of-year initial math test score (running 
variable) 
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Appendix Figure 2—Initial math test scores and gain scores one year later 
Note: This figure is constructed just as Figure 2 is, except that the y-axis is gain scores. Each square 
represents the mean score gain (𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔 = 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) in student standard deviation units (y-axis) for 
students with a given initial test scale score (x-axis), net of grade-by-year-by-school fixed effects. 
Filled squares are pooling retest policy years. Hollow squares are pooling non-retest policy years. 
Fitted lines are by OLS using data at the student-year observation level.  
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Appendix Table 1—Additional results 
RD estimate of 
difference at 
pass/fail cutoff 
Difference-in-
RD estimate 
Non-retest 
years 
Retest years − 
Non-retest 
years Observations 
(1) (2) (3) 
District change in retention at pass/fail after policy ended in 2010 
   Bottom tercile of change -0.000 0.032** 654,634 
      (less retention) (0.012) (0.005) 
   Middle tercile  -0.001 0.030** 2,104,152 
     (roughly no change) (0.009) (0.005) 
   Top tercile (more retention) -0.003 0.034** 1,187,244 
(0.007) (0.010) 
Note: Each row reports estimates from a separate local linear regression with student-by-year 
observations. The estimation details are identical to Table 2 row 1 (the main estimate), except the 
estimation sample is restricted to subsamples as defined in the row headers. In all rows the 
specification is a difference-in-RD. The right-hand-side has separate linear terms for the running 
variable (initial math test score in year 𝑡𝑡) above and below the cutoff, and the slopes are allowed to 
differ in each year as in Figure 1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the values of the 
running variable. 
+ indicates p<0.10, * 0.05, and ** 0.01 
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Appendix Table 2—Teacher value added to retest scores 
as a predictor for future scores 
All retested students 
“Level II” 
students 
All LEAs 
LEAs which used retest 
rule in 2008 
(1) (2) (3) 
Year 𝑡𝑡 teacher’s value-added to retest score 0.283** 0.278** 0.261** 
(0.017) (0.025) (0.03) 
Retest policy year 0.052** 0.026+ 0.009 
(0.009) (0.013) (0.016) 
Retest policy year * 0.047* 0.069* 0.074+ 
   Year 𝑡𝑡 teacher’s value-added to retest score (0.023) (0.034) (0.041) 
Note: Each column reports estimates from a separate least squares regression. The dependent 
variable is student 𝑖𝑖’s initial test score in year 𝑡𝑡 + 1. The key dependent variable is the “value added 
to retest” score for student 𝑖𝑖’s year 𝑡𝑡 teacher. See text for the description of this value added score. 
The specification also includes fixed effects for year 𝑡𝑡 + 1 teacher. Additional covariates are year 𝑡𝑡 
initial test score; indicators for gender, race/ethnicity, limited English proficient; and days absent. 
The estimation sample is limited to 𝑡𝑡 = 2008 and 2009, before and after the retest policy began 
respectively. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the teacher level.  
+ indicates p<0.10, * 0.05, and ** 0.01 
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